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Essay
The Well-Intentioned Purpose but Weak
Epistemological Foundation of Originalism
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE
The attraction of an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation
is understandable. It is maintained that only that method can provide the
judicial objectivity and certainty that constitutional adjudication requires.
They claim that the traditional common-law evolutionary approach leads
Supreme Court Justices to succumb to the temptation to fill in gaps in
constitutional law and thereby ignore that major expansions in
constitutional meaning and should be made in the way the Founders
envisioned, namely by amendment of the Constitution. However difficult or
impractical that process may be, it is the only way to avoid the politicization
of the Court. Whether that goal is achievable is highly unlikely, as is shown
by the large number of five-to-four decisions of the Court. The original
understanding is often hotly contested and, as shown in this Essay, often
inconsistently applied. It is naïve to expect that, once the Court claims to
have discovered the original understanding, a future Court would not
disagree.
Significant members of the founding generation realized that, in the
process of interpreting and applying the Constitution, its meaning would
evolve, even in ways that were contrary to the expectations of the Founders,
and this is what has happened. In trying to halt and even overturn those
developments, originalists have also failed to consider that the founding
generation was concerned with more than the semantics of the Constitution
as if it were a secular scripture.
As is argued in this Essay, the Founders also had understandings about
what was the comparative importance of its clauses in case of conflicts. In
adopting the Constitution their ultimate purpose was to create a lasting
political society. It is hard to believe that they would accept economic
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collapse or civil unrest for what some judges believed was textual
faithfulness.
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The Well-Intentioned Purpose but Weak
Epistemological Foundation of Originalism
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE *
I. THE ATTRACTION OF ORIGINALISM
It is certainly understandable that a thoughtful person might champion
an approach to constitutional interpretation that is based as much as possible
on the original understanding of the Founding Fathers, or the generation of
which the Founders were a part, to discover the meaning of the text of the
Constitution. Despite the difficulty of reconstructing the mindset of an
amorphous late eighteenth century elite, a rational person might nevertheless
still believe that only by referring to the public meaning of the text of the
Constitution at the time of its adoption can constitutional adjudication
achieve not only objectivity, but also the maximum possible certainty. The
need for as much objectivity as possible in judicial decision-making is
obvious. So is the need for certainty, to the maximum extent attainable,
because the law must be clear enough and consistently applied to provide
both the guidance that officials need in order to discharge their official
responsibilities and the predictability that ordinary citizens need to arrange
their lives and affairs. But it should also be obvious that, given the
complexity and dynamic quality of social life, no fixed set of established
rules and practices is comprehensive enough to regulate all the present and
future activities and responsibilities of officials or citizens. There is always
a residual need for human beings to exercise some degree of discretion, or
what the ancients called “practical wisdom” or “prudence.” The more
important a person’s role and activities, particularly as they relate to
interactions with other people, the more important it is that the exercise of
that discretion be guided by practical wisdom. Originalism tries to establish
the parameters within which the exercise of judicial discretion must be
conducted. How well that endeavor can succeed in achieving this goal is
another matter.
Dictionaries provide several meanings for the word “discretion.”1 Two
*
George C. Christie, James B. Duke Professor Emeritus of Law, Duke University School of Law.
I wish to thank H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Blocher, Stephen Sachs, Jedediah Purdy, Michael Mirande,
and Deborah Christie who were kind enough to read and comment on drafts of this Essay.
1
E.g., Discretion, B LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“1. Wise conduct and management;
cautious discernment; prudence. 2. Individual judgment; the power of free decision-making.”); J.
KENDRICK KINNEY, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 260 (1987) (defining discretion as “[l]iberty
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overlapping meanings figure in legal discourse. One of these focuses on the
normative features of the term.3 For example, a mature adult is someone who
has reached the age of discretion. Such a person can be expected to make
good choices about the appropriate things to do or say when confronted with
situations that require making important decisions. The other, and much
more frequent, use of the term discretion in legal discourse focuses
principally on the activities of judges and other officials.4 The essence of
this usage is that people granted discretion to make decisions under
conditions of uncertainty are accountable for the choices they make to those
who have granted them the authority to exercise that discretion.5 Under the
first, more normative use of the term, people who make bad choices may be
said to show “poor” discretion for which they may bear some moral
responsibility in the eyes of others, but they are not necessarily accountable
to others for the choices they have made. Under the second meaning, whose
key feature is accountability to others, it makes sense to say that decisionmakers have engaged in an “abuse” of discretion when they exceed the
authority they have been granted, even if they have made what most people
would accept was the better choice from the moral point of view. The goal
of originalists is to prevent judges, in well-intentioned attempts to conform
the Constitution to contemporary conditions, from abusing the discretion
that the body-politic has delegated to them.6
Judges are par excellence examples of officials who are responsible to
their society for the consequences of their decisions. That is why many judges
might prefer a legal regime that narrowly limits their range of discretion and
makes it easier for them to transfer the moral responsibility for their decisions
to the law, such as would be the case if a statute were in question.7 A trial
judge, for example, might feel particularly uneasy if he were granted a broad
range of decisional authority in a controversial case and force him to accept a
to act according to one’s own ideas of right; the liberty of adapting one’s conduct to circumstances; the
exercise of judgment”).
2
George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 747 (1986).
3
See id. at 751 (discussing discretion as prudence in decision-making).
4
Id. at 752.
5
Id.
6
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
143–60 (1990) (arguing that Supreme Court departures from the original meaning of the Constitution are
not democratically correctable and alter the design of the American Republic); ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY 37–47 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997) (noting that Evolutionists “take the power of changing rights away from the legislature and give it
to the courts”).
7
This subject and the related issue of academics advising courts in broad terms because they did
not want to bear the responsibility for the judicial application of their advice is discussed in George C.
Christie, Some Reasons Courts Have Become Active Participants in the Search for Ultimate Moral and
Political Truth, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND . . . 315, 316–17 (Alexis Albarian & Olivier Moréteau eds.,
2016).
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greater than usual moral responsibility for his decision. Such a judge would
be aware that the decision might be overturned and its rationale rejected by
appellate courts as well as subject to criticism by members of the legal
profession. Even judges sitting on the highest courts are aware that their
exercise of broad discretion in controversial cases will be open to criticism
from legal academics, and sometimes from the public at large, for stretching
their discretion too far. Nevertheless, judges can also be open to criticism for
not being bolder in the exercise of their discretion. It is common knowledge
that judges often avoid moral responsibility for decisions that many people
would consider morally dubious by declaring that, much as they tried to reach
a more morally acceptable decision, “the opinion just wouldn’t write,”9 and
they were therefore required to follow existing law, even if that law was
unwise or morally suspect. For example, a panel of the Fourth Circuit upheld
a district court’s refusal to allow a defendant who had pleaded guilty to
withdraw her plea because she had not been provided with sentencing
guidelines before she entered her plea.10 In doing so, the panel declared that,
while “sympathetic to the concerns of defense counsel, we are constrained by
existing law.”11 In a more recent case in the Tax Court, a grandmother who
had been the principal support of her grandchildren who were living with her,
the court upheld a ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to recover
tax refunds and credits because her son and daughter-in-law had already
claimed them and used the proceeds to buy drugs.12 The law also serves to
relieve government officials of responsibility for good faith mistakes in
exercising their authorized discretionary duties13 and the same for jurors.14
Sometimes a court may be reluctant even to accept the moral
responsibility for hearing politically explosive cases. There are well known
instances in which the Supreme Court has stretched its authority to control
its docket to avoid hearing obviously meritorious and important cases by
declaring that those cases were devoid of a properly presented federal

8

Id. at 316.
Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 791
(1981).
10
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092 (4th Cir., 1999).
11
Id. at 1099.
12
Smyth v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1132 (T.C. 2017). The court declared
that “except to say that we are bound by the law … it is impossible for us to convince ourselves that the
result we reach today . . . is in any way just.” Id. at 5.
13
See e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
14
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL 48, 94–95, 122–234, 160–63, 186 (2008). Whitman presents very creditable evidence
that the “reasonable doubt” test was in large part adopted to allow judges and jurors to overcome their
fear that they might be damned, if they condemned an innocent defendant to death, by transferring their
moral responsibility to the law.
9

458

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2
15

question or lacked a substantial federal question.
Obviously, the ability of the law to remove the moral or political
responsibility of a decision from judges depends on the clarity of the
governing law. In areas of law where the social objectives are narrow in
scope and a high degree of certainty and predictability is the paramount
objective—as in the law governing title to property, or insurance, or even
some areas of tort law—it is not surprising that judges feel more comfortable
with so-called bright-line legal doctrines, established by statute or by a series
of judicial decisions, that reduce much of the inevitable ambiguity and
vagueness of all legal directives.16 At the other end of the spectrum, cases
involving more general legal language and more numerous competing
values understandably present a source of discomfort to decision-makers.17
That is certainly true in many of the cases that are the focus of the current
controversies over the appropriate approach to construing the Constitution.
The need to relieve judges of that burden—and particularly to restrain as
much as possible Supreme Court Justices from succumbing to the temptation
to fill those gaps in constitutional adjudication—motivates the advocates of
originalism.
An advocate for an originalist approach to constitutional adjudication
might accept that the common-law approach to legal reasoning is objective
because judges take seriously their obligation to be objective and accept the
constraints imposed on their discretion by the doctrine of stare decisis,
which puts great emphasis on consistency. But it is argued that this approach
is not adequate for constitutional adjudication because by allowing the
gradual evolution of legal doctrine to accommodate social changes, it does
not provide the greater certainty required to uphold the legitimacy of
constitutional adjudication.18 For an originalist, the text of the Constitution,
when its meaning is ascertainable, overrides any other consideration and
15
The most famous of such cases is Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E. 2d 849 (Va. 1956), appeal dismissed,
350 U.S. 985 (1956), which was severely criticized in Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959). Naim involved a challenge to the Virginia antimiscegenation statute. In turn, ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 49–65, 70–72
(1st ed. 1962), strongly supported the Court’s use of that tactic in these particular situations. Bickel’s
point was that the Court had enough on its hands while it was trying to enforce Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), the Court used the same tactic
to avoid ruling on a same-sex marriage ban.
16
See Frederic R. Coudert, Certainty and Justice, 14 YALE L.J. 361, 363 (1905) (discussing the
natural comfort associated with a fair degree of certainty and how that created judicial custom).
17
See Philip Soper, Metaphors and Models of Law: The Judge as Priest, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1196–
99 (1977) (“The first intuition is that the goal of the judge, however unobtainable or unrealistic in
practice, is ideally to ‘find’ rather than to ‘make’ the law.”).
18
See Mary Wood, Scalia Defends Originalism as Best Methodology for Judging Law, U. VA. SCH.
L. (Apr. 20, 2010) https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/2010_spr/scalia.htm (“All these questions pose
enormous difficulty for non-originalists, who must agonize over what the modern Constitution ought to
mean with regard to each of these subjects, and then agonize over the very same questions five or [ten]
years later, because times change[.]” (quoting J. Scalia)).
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leaves no room for the exercise of judicial discretion. That is to say, the
Constitution should be treated as something approaching a religious text
whose precepts are unchangeable, with the caveat that, unlike such a text,
the Constitution does provide a process for its amendment.
The epistemological foundation of the originalist approach is the claim
that it is bottomed on historical facts and on the assumption that, once that
original understanding is discovered, it will be fixed for all time.20 That
approach to constitutional adjudication ignores that the original
understanding of the meaning of the Constitution is often a highly contested
matter even among originalists with differing views on how much discretion
the original public meaning of the Constitution allows courts to exercise in
order to accommodate precedent, government practice, or changing social
conditions.21 There certainly has often been disagreement among Supreme
Court Justices about what we should understand the Founders to have meant
in drafting the text of the Constitution.22 It is not only religion that is prone
to “reformation.” That is why it was not disingenuous of Justice Kagan to
have asserted at her confirmation hearings in 2010 that, despite the sharp
differences among the Justices in recent years, “we are all originalists.”23
Such differences are inevitable even if one only focuses on the often
hotly disputed issue of what was the shared understanding of the founding
generation on the meaning of the terms used in the Constitution. Differences
became more inevitable if one considers the other important factors that
must be considered when interpreting the Constitution. As acknowledged by
many originalists, the members of the founding generation also held views
19
It has been noted in recent scholarship that Justices searching for the correct interpretation of the
meaning of the Constitution often maintain that the custom of giving greater weight on the importance
of stare decisis when statutory interpretation is involved should be rejected if that statutory interpretation
is not the “correct” one. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L.
REV. 157, 202–14 (2018) (discussing the willingness of the Court’s textualist Justices to abandon stare
decisis and argue in favor of overruling established statutory interpretation precedents).
20
See Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 71,
78, 81 (2016) (discussing how originalism is an objective and dispassionate reporting on the past).
21
See id. (discussing the theoretical construction of original public meaning). For a more general
discussion of the widespread use of construction in legal discourse, see GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, THE
NOTION OF AN IDEAL AUDIENCE IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 26 (2000). See also William Baude, Is
Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2349 (2015) (arguing that originalism should be
understood inclusively, and that our current constitutional practices demonstrate a commitment to
inclusive originalism). Important earlier articles discussing the variation of originalism theory include
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 749–50 (2011); Christopher
R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1621–31 (2009).
22
See Glen Staszewski, Precedent and Disagreement, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2018)
(“Supreme Court [J]ustices have fundamentally competing perspectives regarding the best approach to
constitutional interpretation.”).
23
The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of Elena
Kagan). One might say that original meaning is a construct.
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on the social, moral, and political issues that come into play in deciding
difficult questions of constitutional interpretation.24 These worldviews
would include not only prejudices but also shared expectations about the
future—for example, that the United States would continue to be a Christian
country and overwhelmingly Protestant.25 Some of the founding generation
would have assumed that the future, although inevitably subject to some
change, would still look pretty much like the present, whether they liked that
present or not. It is a factor that figured in the controversies over “internal
improvements”26 that characterized pre-Civil War politics and still figures
in contemporary controversies over the reach of the federal government
under the Commerce Clause. Other members of the founding generation
may have taken a more expansive view of the future, for better or for
worse.27 The founding generation also had ideas, expectations, and hopes
about how the Constitution should or would be construed by the judiciary
and how conflicts between competing terms and clauses of the Constitution
would be resolved when it was impossible to be faithful to each of the
competing terms or clauses. Would the Founders have shared beliefs about
the relative importance of the conflicting terms or clauses? Finally, in
interpreting the Constitution, one would certainly need to consider what the
founding generation understood to be the purpose of the Constitution they
were adopting.28
If one refuses to expand one’s vision to include all these aspects of
constitutional interpretation, one must face up to the problem of dissents,
which, if common, give traction to the allegation that controversial judicial
decisions are inevitably influenced by the ideological preferences of
judges.29 One way many jurisdictions have dealt with the problem of dissents
24
See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 157 (2017) (explaining
how originalism is not fundamentally about texts, but rather original meanings).
25
See JOHN CORRIGAN & WINTHROP S. HUDSON, RELIGION IN AMERICA 35 (8th ed. 2010)
(addressing the Protestant predominance in the English Colonies). For a discussion of the continued
judicial recognition of the United States as a Christian nation until the mid-twentieth century, see Paul
Finkleman, Concept of “Christian Nation” in American Jurisprudence, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 343, 343 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006).
26
See JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE
PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 2 (2001) (analyzing the various
movements taking place during the American Revolution, and how they influenced politics in the postrevolutionary era).
27
Alexander Hamilton was certainly one of the most vigorous advocates for a more expansive view
of the potential future of the United States. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3, 6, 254–56,
351–54, 377–79 (2004) (explaining how much of the American capitalist system can be accredited to
Hamilton’s foresight in his expansive commercial vision and democratic design).
28
David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 YALE L.
J. 664, 666–68 (2018) (reviewing RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF
MODERN DEMOCRACY (2016)). This is a subject that will be discussed at some length in Part V, infra.
29
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864–65 (1989)
(discussing how originalism works to eliminate judicial preference).

2018]

THE WELL-INTENTIONED PURPOSE

461

is to prohibit them—no matter how divided the judges—as in the French
judicial system, the European Court of Justice, and many other civil law
jurisdictions modeled on the French system.30 If a jurisdiction permits
dissenting opinions, it can accommodate them in at least two ways. If there
is a large majority in favor of the decision, such as the occasional fifteen-totwo31 and sixteen-to-one32 decisions in the European Court of Human
Rights, one can say that the dissenters are just plain wrong. That is a harder
perspective to take if the division is five-to-four as is often the case in the
Supreme Court of the United States. But if one accepts that the body of the
law is always adapting to accommodate the evolution of society, as has
traditionally been the case in common-law countries, it is not too unsettling
since judges in these legal systems are expected, when necessary, to engage
in judicial legislation as long as the changes are not too frequent or too
broad.33 But if one is looking for a truth that trumps legal traditions and
government practice, and also accepts that there is a fixed meaning to a
constitution that must be followed regardless of how much sense it makes in
contemporary society, one would find the recent history of five-to-four
decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States very troubling.
In the five terms from 2010 through 2014, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided 383 argued cases, not all with written opinions.34 Of
these 383 cases, eighty-three (over 22%) involved at least one issue on which
the Court divided five-to-four.35 More germane and noteworthy is that of
these eighty-three five-to-four decisions, in fifty-nine of them, Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan were together either as dissenters
or as part of the majority.36 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito were likewise together as part of the majority or as the
30
Michael Kirby, Judicial Dissent—Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 123 L. Q. REV. 379,
382–83, 395 (2007).
31
See, e.g., S.A.S. v. France, 60 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 59 (2014) (holding by fifteen votes to two that
there was not a violation of the convention, annexing the dissenting opinions from the judgment).
32
See, e.g., Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 39 (2005) (holding by sixteen votes to one
that there was not a violation of the convention, annexing the dissenting opinion from the judgment).
33
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 220 (1960)
(discussing the use of leeway in regards to the power of the judicial appellate office).
34
These are the cumulative numbers taken from the Supreme Court section of the Chief Justice’s
Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary for the calendar years 2011 to 2015. Chief Justice’s Year-End
Reports on the Federal Judiciary, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/year-endreports.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
35
These numbers are taken from the tabulations for the five terms from October Term 2010 (OT10)
to October Term 2014 (OT14). Kedar S. Bhatia, Final October Term 2017 Stat Pack, SCOTUSBLOG 18
(June
29,
2018),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/SB_Stat_Pack_2018.06.29.pdf. A similar pattern has continued in October
Term 2017 (OT17), the first full term in which Justice Gorsuch was a member of the Court. Roberts,
Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch were members of the majority in thirteen cases in which Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan were the dissenters. Id. at 18–19.
36
Id.
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dissenters. As will be shown as this discussion proceeds, these cases often
reflect the debate on whether precedents should continue to be followed or
whether the alleged “original understanding” of the founding generation
should prevail over the traditional legal practice of stare decisis.38 Surely a
judicial process that regularly produces these sorts of outcomes needs
greater justification than that five is more than four. Particularly if it is to
escape the charge that controversial decisions are often driven as much by
political or ideological considerations, and even by the results of presidential
elections, as by the “law.”
II. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
One of the universally accepted purposes of a written constitution is to
provide a body of law that is insulated from direct political interference and,
hopefully, even pressure. In the United States, this endeavor to maintain the
continuity and integrity of constitutional adjudication has typically been
played out through a process of constitutional adjudication that tries to
merge textual meaning and historical practice in a way that produces a
coherent whole.39 The present time is perceived as a period of great social
and economic change. Many people, including members of the public at
large, as well as some judges and academics argue that, in constitutional
interpretation, the continued reliance by the Court on allegedly wrongly
decided judicial precedents and long-standing governmental practice has
given the judiciary a role in government that is inappropriate for judges.40
This is because it ignores the whole purpose of a fixed written constitution
designed to insulate its interpretation from extra-textual ideological and
political considerations. To fulfill this purpose, it is argued that because the
Constitution provides a method for its amendment, if change is needed, it
should be made through that process, even if it is difficult, cumbersome,
time-consuming, and often impossible as a practical matter.41
As already noted, this emphasis on text treats the Constitution as
37

Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 115–23.
39
See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 28, at 692–93 (discussing how judges may seek to synchronize
constitutional approaches).
40
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 2 (2012) (describing the increasingly troublesome legislative role of the judicial branch).
41
Id. at 2–7; BORK, supra note 6, at 143–49. See also Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory
of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 817, 818–21 (2015) (describing how originalism seeks
legal change through avenues that have been defined by the law and are interpreted in the context during
which they were instituted); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in
Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2015) (noting the controversy surrounding
constitutional interpretation and the tensions between originalist and living constitutionalist approaches);
Scalia, supra note 29, at 852–56 (discussing the textual interpretation of the judiciary and the importance
of adhering to the original language of legislation); supra text accompanying notes 8–14 (discussing how
judges cannot always write their opinions in the most morally acceptable ways).
38
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something of a secular scripture. The question is whether this view of the
text of the Constitution is like that of St. Augustine,42 who in the early fifth
century cautioned against always taking the factual statements in the Bible
literally rather than figuratively, or something more like the approach of
modern-day believers in scriptural inerrancy.43 The position of those who
insist on the absolute supremacy of the original understanding of the
Constitution, when it is ascertainable, is more like that taken by the latter.
As many have pointed out, even the clearest instructions must allow for
exceptions.44 Kent Greenawalt gives an example of an instruction given to
an intelligent child “not [to] leave [his] room in the next half hour for any
reason whatsoever,” for disciplinary purposes.45 One would expect, and
surely hope, that the child would leave the room should a fire break out.46
One might also hope that, even if the original understanding of the Founders’
generation is easily discoverable, the same resort to common sense might
sometimes be accepted as appropriate in constitutional adjudication.
Nevertheless, relying on the obligation to respect the original
understanding of the Founders’ generation when that understanding can be
clearly ascertained, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, recently overturned
precedents that it claimed extended the capacious reach of the Commerce
Clause beyond what the Founders’ generation intended.47 Additionally, with
the same division among the Justices, the Court overruled a precedent
allowing greater regulation of firearms than they asserted the Second
Amendment allowed.48 By respecting the wishes of the Founders, this
42
ST. AUGUSTINE, 1 LITERAL MEANING OF GENESIS 19, at 415 (John H. Taylor trans. 1982). This
is Volume 41 in a series denominated ANCIENT CHRISTIAN WRITERS: THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS IN
TRANSLATION (Johannes Quasten et al. eds., 1982). St. Ambrose is also among the early church fathers
who took the same position. See R. H. Malden, St. Ambrose as an Interpreter of Holy Scripture, 16 J.
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 509, 510–16 (1915) (discussing the moral and allegorical interpretations of biblical
stories in the Old Testament).
43
Id.
44
See Kent Greenawalt, Philosophy of Language, Linguistics, and Possible Lessons about
Originalism, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 46, 51–53 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017)
(arguing that linguistically, there are exceptions to a rule even if not stated, and citing numerous
additional scholars to support that claim).
45
Id. at 57.
46
Id. This book also contains a sharp exchange between Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism,
Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 130 (Brian G.
Slocum ed., 2017), and Francis J. Mootz, III, Getting Over the Originalism Fixation, in THE NATURE OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 156 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017).
47
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547–63 (2012). The Chief Justice, however,
joined the four dissenters on the Commerce Clause issue to uphold the act as an exercise of Congress’
power to impose taxes. Id. at 646.
48
Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller), 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008). This decision overrode the
unanimous decision of the Court in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939), that the Second
Amendment’s principal purpose was to provide for a trained militia. In McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.
742 (2010), also a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the Second Amendment is one of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights that is fully applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
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approach to constitutional adjudication claims to base judicial decisions on
historical fact.49 As such, it is a subset of the many attempts to make judicial
decision making a largely fact-based process, a subject that will be discussed
more broadly as the discussion proceeds. It is argued that anchoring difficult
constitutional decisions to the historical facts surrounding the adoption of
the Constitution can give certainty to the law, and it also insulates the Court
from the suggestion that it is assuming an inappropriate constitutional role
and circumventing the amendment process.50 Whether this “true” meaning
or understanding of the Constitution will stand forever once it has been
established is another question.
The many problems raised by this approach to constitutional
adjudication have led to the present explosion of academic discourse on what
is exactly meant by originalism, its merits, and the validity of the
epistemology upon which it is based.51 The core of the debate revolves
around the attempt to answer the difficult questions noted in the
introduction. These include determining what exactly was the original public
understanding of the meaning of the text of the Constitution, and what was
expected at the time of the Constitution’s adoption to be the judiciary’s role
in interpreting that text over time. These are questions that are not easily
answered, as the plethora of five-to-four decisions clearly illustrates. First of
all, it is difficult to determine the actual meaning of constitutional provisions
when their meaning is seriously contested in particular cases. In Heller v.
District of Columbia, the first of the recent Second Amendment cases, the
Court was confronted with a precedent52 holding that, because the right to
bear arms was, as the text itself suggested, premised on the need for a “wellregulated Militia,”53 the federal and state governments had considerable
Id. at 778. Although some of the substance of the Bill of Rights was applied to the states under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not until the 1960s that the verbatim application of
some of the Bill of Rights began to be extended to the states under that clause. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (applying freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
148 (1968) (applying the right to a jury trial in criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment via the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
49
See Solum, supra note 41, at 46 (“From the perspective of originalism, the question is which of
these two competing interpretations provides the actual communicative content of the Fourteenth
Amendment. What kind of evidence bears on this question? One . . . kind of evidence is based on
linguistic facts (patterns of usage during the Reconstruction Era) and context (the circumstances in which
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and ratified): call this kind of evidence ‘historical facts.’”).
50
See BORK, supra note 6, at 43; Sachs, supra note 41, at 839–46.
51
See supra notes 20–22, 24 (naming academic sources discussing the merits and theoretical
framework of originalism); infra text accompanying notes 108–16 (differentiating between redistricting
done by the legislature and by ballot initiative using originalism).
52
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 623 (discussing Miller’s “proposition that the Second Amendment right
. . . extends to only certain types of weapons”).
53
See id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Neither the text of the Amendment nor the arguments
advanced by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting any legislature’s authority to
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latitude in regulating the possession and use of firearms by individuals.
Against the contention of the four dissenting justices, the Heller majority, in
an opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that the Amendment was also, if
not even primarily, aimed at guaranteeing a pre-existing individual right to
carry arms to defend one’s self, family, and home.54 While some regulation
of the possession of firearms was permissible, and actually practiced both
before and after the adoption of the Constitution, the majority ruled that the
admittedly very severe restrictions on the carrying and possession of hand
guns in the District of Columbia were unconstitutional.55 The correctness of
the Court’s ruling about the actual original understanding of the Second
Amendment is by no means accepted by many scholars56 who agreed with
Justice Stevens, the author of one of the two dissents joined by all the
dissenters in Heller.57 More recent and more extensive historical scholarship
provides considerable support for the position of Justice Stevens and those
who, in the aftermath of the Heller decision, supported his position.58
Nevertheless, the question for the moment is what sort of regulation is
permitted regarding either the individuals who may carry firearms or the
type of firearms they may carry. Recently, in Friedman v. City of Highland,
the Court refused to decide whether it is permissible to regulate the
possession of automatic weapons.59 In dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by
regulate private civilian uses of firearms.”); id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Second Amendment
protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests.”); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 890
n.33 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he court badly misconstrued the Second Amendment in linking
it to the value of personal self-defense above and beyond the functioning of state militias . . . .”); id. at
917 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In my view, . . . the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms for purposes of private self-defense.”).
54
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (“The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need
for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”); id. at 592 (“We look to [the historical
background] because it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First
and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”).
55
See id. at 636 (“The Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for combating
that problem, including some measures regulating handguns. But the enshrinement of constitutional
rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute prohibition of
handguns held and used for self-defense in the home.” (citations omitted)).
56
See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Living Constitution and Second Amendment: Poor History, False
Originalism, and a Very Confused Court, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 624 (2015) (criticizing the Supreme
Court’s historical analysis of the Second Amendment); Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the
History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 721, 740–47 (2013) (summarizing the criticism of originalist historical analysis in Heller). See
generally MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT (2014) (discussing the history of the Second
Amendment and criticizing the originalist historical analysis in Heller).
57
Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote the other unanimous
dissenting opinion. Id. at 681 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
58
PATRICK J. CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL
MILITIAS TO CONCEALED CARRY 41–121 (2018) (arguing that the main thrust of the Second Amendment
was indeed concerned with the militia and that much of the scholarship and treatment of historical
evidence relied on by Justice Scalia was both biased and poorly researched).
59
See 136 S. Ct. 447, 447 (2015) (mem.) (denying certiorari).
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Justice Scalia, declared that the Court should have decided whether semiautomatic rifles with magazines holding ten bullets were covered by the
guarantee of the Second Amendment.60 They noted that the Seventh
Circuit’s decision “flouts two of our Second Amendment precedents.”61
Subsequently, the Court vacated and remanded for further consideration a
Massachusetts decision that had upheld a prohibition on the use of stun guns
on the ground that they were not in common use at the time of the Second
Amendment’s adoption.62 The Court relied on the statement in Heller that
the “Amendment extends . . . to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,
even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”63
Obviously, at the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption in 1791,
automatic rifles were unknown. That, of course, leads us to the next
question. Assuming the original understanding of a particular term can be
said to be ascertainable, what happens when over time the meaning of that
term expands well beyond the expectation of the Founders’ generation? If
automatic rifles can be considered a natural evolution of a term with a
historically more limited reach, how about a laser gun or any other weapon
that, while not considered a “firearm,” is as lethal as a weapon that fires
bullets? The problem of whether the meaning of the text of the Constitution
should reflect the evolution of the scope of the crucial words in question is
a difficult one.
In contrast to the willingness in Heller to expand the meaning of
“arms,”64 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for four other Justices, held that the
federal government could not use the Commerce Clause to support the
requirement that individuals purchase health insurance for themselves
because the Founders could not have conceived that lacking health insurance
would be within the meaning of “commerce” at the time the Constitution
was adopted.65 Something like that argument was rejected in Pensacola
Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.66 in 1877, in which it was
argued that the commerce power did not authorize Congress to grant
telegraph companies the right to construct telegraph lines “over any portion
of the public domain of the United States, . . . and . . . the military or post
roads of the United States.”67 In rejecting that argument, and the contention
60
Id. at 450 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to
Assault Weapon Ban, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courtguns/supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-assault-weapon-ban-idUSKBN0TQ1SU20151207.
61
Friedman, 136 S. Ct. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027–28 (2016) (per curiam).
63
Id. at 1027 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008)). One might ask, “How about particularly
lethal explosive ammunition?”
64
Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–77.
65
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 554–55 (2012).
66
96 U.S. 1 (1877).
67
Id. at 3.
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of two of the three dissenters that Congress only had the power to authorize
construction on land actually belonging to the United States,68 the Court
declared that, “within the scope of its powers,” the government of the United
States “operates upon every foot of its territory.”69 It also declared that,
although the electric telegraph was unknown, “[t]he powers thus granted [to
Congress] are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, or the
postal service known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they
keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new
developments of time and circumstances.”70 In recent times, the Court has
accepted that the local growing of marijuana is within the commerce power
of the federal government in order to support its criminalization of the use
and possession of marijuana.71 Although not joining the other five Justices
in the majority opinion, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.72
In the light of these decisions, one would think that, in an age when
almost any person who seeks medical help will use facilities and products
that are dependent on interstate commerce and also in many ways supported
by federal resources, requiring individuals to buy health insurance should be
within the federal government’s power to support the economic structure of
the United States. The fact that people have health insurance also facilitates
the mobility of the labor force, and certainly has a greater impact on the
economy than the local growing of marijuana.73 Given this history, a cynic
might say what the adopters of the Constitution understood to be the ambit
of the meaning of its general terms is all in the eyes of the observer.74
The same subjective perspective might be attributed to the present Court
in the reliance of some Justices on judicial notice of supposedly empirically
discoverable social facts in their search for objective criteria to support their
positions. The most famous recent instance in the United States is the finding
made by a five-to-four majority of the Court in Shelby County v. Holder.75
68

Id. at 17 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 10.
70
Id. at 9.
71
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19–22 (2005).
72
Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
73
Compare Effects of Health Care Spending on the U.S. Economy, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., (Feb. 22, 2005) (reporting $1.67 trillion spent on health care in 2003), with Eli McVey, US
Marijuana Industry’s Economic Impact Could Hit $80 Billion by 2022, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (May
29, 2018), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-us-marijuana-industrys-economic-impact-could-reach-80billion-by-2022 (reporting $20–23 billion in total economic impact for marijuana in 2017).
74
While Chief Justice Roberts relied on what the Founders might have understood to be commerce
in ruling that Congress’s commerce power does not cover imposing an obligation to buy health insurance,
he had no trouble in agreeing that forcing someone to pay a tax for not buying health insurance was
within the taxing power. It is hard to believe that the Founders would have thought that to be a legitimate
use of congressional power. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 555, 558–61, 571–
74 (2012) (holding constitutional protection from federal regulations governing inactivity does not apply
to taxing power).
75
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 2617.
69
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The Court held that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as reauthorized in 2006, was unconstitutional because current social conditions
in the United States did not justify imposing on the states and other public
bodies the burdens of seeking pre-clearance of changes affecting voting
procedures in previously segregated areas of the country.76 That social
conditions in the United States had changed for the better since 1965 is
indisputable—but how great that change had been is another matter. The
question is, how did the Court know that the extent of this change was so
self-evident that it made pre-clearance unnecessary in 2013 when the Court
decided the case? It is obvious that what is the true state of current society
is often not completely clear. Much of what we believe to be true is merely
the opinion of experts who have studied the subject and have a much deeper
knowledge of the concrete facts underlying their opinions. There was no
such unanimity of opinion among academic experts at the time Shelby was
decided, and certainly no sufficient agreement as to the present social
conditions in the country to support a judicial conclusion that Congress’
contrary assumption was no longer supported by the facts.77
More common are judicial declarations about what will or will not
happen if a case is or is not decided in a particular way. For example, in
Boumediene v. Bush,78 Justice Scalia argued, in his dissent from the Court’s
holding, that its recognition of the constitutional right to habeas corpus of
detainees in Guantanamo “will almost certainly cause more Americans to be
killed.”79 To the extent that this can be said to be a matter of certainty, it is
no more of a certainty than the claim that the release of convicted felons—
including those found guilty of homicide—will lead to more crimes. Scalia’s
statement is possibly even less certain because released felons have in fact
been found guilty of crimes, whereas the detainees in question have not yet
been convicted of any crimes.80 In speculating as to what might happen,
Justice Scalia did not consider the serious possibility that denying detainees
the right to question the legality of their detention might increase the
hostility of jihadists and actually increase the risk of Americans being killed.
Similarly, in Gonzales v. Carhart,81 another five-to-four decision, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Act on the
ground that, although it found “no reliable data to measure the phenomenon,
76

Id. at 2625–32.
In retrospect, if anything, the Chief Justice was woefully wrong in assuming his assertion was
self-evident. See Editorial, The Voters Abandoned by the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016, at A26
(detailing “anti-voter” laws enacted after Shelby County).
78
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
79
Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He finished his dissent with the words: “The Nation will live to
regret what the Court has done today.” Id. at 850.
80
See id. at 766–67 (noting detainees have been afforded some process, but “there has been no trial
by military commission for violations of the laws of war”).
81
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
77
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it seems unexceptionable to conclude [that] some women come to regret
their choice to abort the infant life they once created . . . [and] [s]evere
depression and loss of esteem can follow.”82 Considering the extreme
conditions that might prompt a woman to seek a partial-birth abortion,83 a
woman who decided not to undergo this procedure might even be more
likely to regret that choice. Giving birth to a hydrocephalic baby would
surely be a cause of emotional distress. More importantly, reliance on that
type of psychological speculation without any serious empirical support is a
questionable judicial practice when delimiting the scope of constitutional
rights.
Finally, one might note that, in his dissent in National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,84 Justice Scalia went out of his way to
declare why the Affordable Care Act would not be effective in practice—an
assertion that many people would not accept has come to pass and definitely
not a result that most people at the time of that decision would have
considered a certainty.85 He also asserted that not striking down the whole
statute would prevent Congress from starting “afresh”86 which, given the
congressional climate at the time the Court rendered its decision, was highly
unlikely. Giving objectivity to judicial resolution of controversial issues by
reference to supposedly universally accepted facts—by either the founding
generation or contemporary society—is often a fraught exercise.
III. PRESERVING ORIGINALISM BY LINGUISTIC STRATAGEMS
One of the ways to preserve superficial faithfulness to the language used
by the Founders in the Constitution is to exploit specific language in the
Constitution that raises what might be called an “affirmative that is pregnant
with a negative.” A prominent example is the provision in Article I, Section
8, Clause 5 granting Congress the power “[t]o coin [m]oney”87 and make it
legal tender, which, for a brief time, was construed by the Court to prohibit
Congress from authorizing the printing of paper money to fund the Civil
War.88 That decision was overturned sixteen months later.89 Given the
antipathy of the founding generation to paper money in light of its use to
fund the American Revolution and their assumption that the federal
government really was one of enumerated powers, it is more likely than not
82

Id. at 159 (citations omitted).
Id.
84
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 646 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 651.
86
Id. at 706. For an examination of the frequency of the Court’s reliance on facts not included in
the record, see Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255,
1264–1277 (2012).
87
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
88
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1869).
89
Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 457 (1871).
83
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that they would have agreed that the federal government could not issue
paper money and make it legal tender. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., certainly
thought that was the original understanding of the clause.90 Nevertheless, it
is not surprising that Congress would take advantage of the failure to
prohibit the issuance of paper money as allowing it to do so. There are,
however, still recent situations in which it has been argued that a
constitutional grant of power could contain an implied negative.91
Similarly, it has been held that a provision of the Constitution which
prohibits a specific action does not prohibit other actions that accomplish the
same goal. That might be said to be an example of a negative that is pregnant
with an affirmative. For example, Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 prohibits
states from emitting bills of credit.92 Nevertheless, regardless of this
provision, state-licensed banks—including banks owned by the states and
whose officers were appointed by public officials—issued bank notes that
functioned as currency throughout the nineteenth century.93 The issuing of
bills of credit by state-owned banks, which functioned as currency, was, not
surprisingly, challenged as being unconstitutional.94 In 1837, the Court
rejected this argument and rendered the provision meaningless.95 This
avoidance of what seemed to be the clear intention of what the Founders
wanted to accomplish by resort to an alternative terminology was not an
unexpected result. With the failure to renew the charter of the Second Bank
of the United States, the United States had nothing that could be considered
a national currency other than the coins minted by federal mints.96 The United
States Treasury issued paper money for the first time during the Civil War,
and Congress passed the National Bank Act in 1863, allowing national banks
to issue paper money.97 Before that, with gold both scarce and cumbersome
to carry, people had no other option but to use bank notes issued by state-

90
See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to the editors of the American Law Review, in 4 AM .
L. REV. 766, 768 (1869) (“I cannot . . . see how the right to make paper legal tender can be claimed for
Congress when the Constitution virtually contains the words, ‘Congress shall have the power to make
metals legal tender.’”). The matter is further discussed in CHARLES FAIRMAN, VI HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88, PART ONE 715, 763 n.221 (1971). Justice
Field made the same point at greater length, using similar language to that of Holmes, in his dissent in
Knox, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 634.
91
In Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034–36 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice
Thomas, together with Justice Alito, argued that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
to hear cases between states did not permit the Court to exercise its discretion not to consider such a case.
92
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
93
See JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774–1970
63 (1973) (discussing the rise of bank notes being used as currency).
94
Briscoe v. President of the Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 260, 286–87 (1837).
95
Id. at 257.
96
See HURST, supra note 93, at 62–63 (discussing the restriction on state-chartered banks to create
currency such as notes—a power which had been given to them by Congress).
97
Id. at 278.
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98

chartered and state-owned banks. With the passage of the National Bank
Act, many people also thought that most state-chartered banks would seek
national charters to take advantage of that opportunity.99 But that proved not
to be the case. More erroneous was the widely held belief that a congressional
act putting a ten percent tax on the issuance of bank notes by state-chartered
banks would end the issuance of “money” by state banks.100 Since most
transfers of money came to be in the form of checks written on banks,
currency became a minor portion of the money supply, regardless of what the
founding generation may have thought they had accomplished in preventing
states from issuing “bills of credit.”101 We now have a financial system
consisting largely of electronic transfers based on a cache of digitalized
figures stored in a “Cloud,” something no Founding Father could have
remotely conceived acceptable, let alone possible.
IV. OTHER INSTANCES IN WHICH LITERALISM HAS NOT TRIUMPHED
There are many other ways in which the Court has departed from what
the drafters of the Constitution thought they were doing. For instance, it is
clear that at the time of the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, the right to
assistance of counsel was not understood as requiring the government to
provide counsel to indigents accused of crimes.102 Additionally, even very
specific terms that were clearly understood at the time of their adoption to
have a specific narrow meaning have been greatly expanded.103 The Court
has also departed from the Drafters’ determination of what an acceptable
punishment is—for example, flogging was acceptable when the Eighth
Amendment was adopted.104 By the time of his death, Justice Scalia came to
believe that the Court was wrong to have declared that practice
unconstitutional.105 He was also one of the four dissenters from the Court’s
98

HURST, supra note 93, at 178.
Id. at 180.
100
See id. (explaining that while proponents of the 1865 tax “thought they were removing the state
banks from influence on the money supply . . . deposit check money rather than bank notes was becoming
the principal instrument of bank lending”).
101
Id.
102
See Judy Norris, History of Indigent Defense in the United States, 18 UPDATE ON L.-RELATED
EDUC. 16, 16–17 (1994) (explaining the development of the requirement that the government provide
counsel to indigents accused of crimes, which took place long after the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment).
103
See, e.g., Bryan A. Garner, A Tribute to Nino, 102 A.B.A.J. 24, 24 (2016) (explaining the
evolution of the word “nimrod”).
104
David E. Weisberg, Justice Scalia's Originalism: A Flawed Theory that Obscures an Important
Truth 16–17 (Jan. 24, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746859.
105
See Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. 3 (Oct. 6, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ (interviewing Justice Scalia about his reformed
belief that flogging is “immensely stupid, but . . . not unconstitutional”). In his article, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, Justice Scalia seemed to suggest that all originalists would strike down any attempt by the
states to re-introduce flogging. Scalia, supra note 29, at 861.
99
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decision that juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment without parole must
eventually be given an opportunity to show that their sentences should be
commuted.106
The attempt to make legal decision-making a quasi-deductive process—
with discoverable basic premises which remove from courts the power and
the need to engage in an exercise of practical wisdom—is a practical
impossibility. It assumes not only that these basic premises are discoverable
but also that, once discovered, their meaning will stay rigidly fixed forever—
regardless of the political, social, and economic evolution of the nation—
because this is what the founding generation actually wanted and expected.
Nor does that approach give sufficient attention to the possibility that future
research will reveal that current understandings of original meanings are, in
fact, erroneous. The attempt to impose a casuistic approach based on a wordby-word linguistic analysis misses the essence of what a constitution is all
about, and, as we have seen in the legal tender and the bills of credit cases,
can often be avoided by parsing the meaning of individual words and
sentences.107
The problems created by an approach to constitutional adjudication that
focuses so heavily on the meaning of individual words and ignores the basic
purpose of a constitution is also illustrated by the five-to-four decision in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Re-districting
Commission.108 The issue was the meaning of the word “legislature” in
Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution: Could a provision in the
Arizona constitution, overwhelmingly adopted by referendum, which gave
redistricting authority to an independent commission, be considered an act
of the legislature?109 Despite New England town-hall law making and the
submission of early state constitutions directly to ratification by the
voters,110 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the dissenters, maintained that
the Arizona commission was not established by the legislature because, at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the general understanding was
that a legislature was the “representative body which makes the laws of the
people.”111 Justice Ginsberg, writing for the majority, argued that the
meaning of the word “legislature” was not so narrowly confined.112 She
106

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479, 493 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
It is not unusual for people to believe that they have said what they meant to say even though a
stickler on grammar could interpret what they have said to mean something different. Whether that
phenomenon is to be welcomed or deplored depends on the circumstances.
108
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Re-Districting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2653 (2015).
109
Id. at 2659.
110
See Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57, 57
(1982) (discussing how ratification of state constitutions by popular referendum became the trend during
the post-Civil War 1800s).
111
Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2679 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 2666.
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observed that the Court had held in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant that an
amendment to the Ohio Constitution that gave the people of the state the
right, exercisable by referendum, to approve or disapprove any law enacted
by the state legislature was also applicable to an act redistricting the state’s
congressional districts.113 She also noted that in Smiley v. Holm, the Court
had held that redistricting legislation in Minnesota could be subject to the
governor’s veto power.114 The Chief Justice rejoined that, in these cases, the
Court recognized that a legislature was the “representative body” that makes
“the laws of the people” and in the case at hand there was no participation at
all by that body in the Arizona redistricting process.115 There is no question
that the founding generation wanted a process that responded to the people
of the respective states.116 They never envisaged, however, that with current
technology, legislatures could be dispensed with and all laws would be made
by referenda conducted on the internet in which citizens would vote on laws
proposed by the executive or by petition. Whatever the “true interpretation”
of the term “legislature” in Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution, I am
skeptical that the Founders, who accepted the importance of states’ rights
more than is now generally accepted, would have insisted that the states were
prohibited from using technological advances to introduce a more
democratic law-making process unless the Constitution was amended.
Thus far, we have noted that the original understanding of the
Constitution is often a very contested issue. If one focuses on specific terms
that had only one meaning in 1787–1789 and the same meaning today—
such as that the Senate “shall be composed of two Senators from each State,”
or that, to be President, one must “have attained to the [a]ge of thirty-five
[y]ears,”117—a literal meaning makes sense. Beyond that, this approach
makes less sense. Regarding more general terms, such as “Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States” and the “necessary and
proper” clause,118 the evidence of the true meaning of those broad terms
during the founding period is uncertain and often contradictory, since it
requires an inquiry into the worldview and psychological perspective of
people who are long dead. General terms can have more than one meaning
and we can never be sure the drafters always chose the most common
meaning. If the most common meaning does not make any sense at all under
present conditions, it would not be irrational or unfaithful to choose an
113

Id. at 2666–67 (citing Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 566 (1916)).
Id. at 2667 (citing Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 355 (1932)).
115
Id. at 2678 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365).
116
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 237 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern
the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of
the [s]tate.”).
117
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. art. II, § 1.
118
Id. art. I, § 8.
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alternative meaning that has some plausible support. When the text of the
Constitution is relatively specific and detailed, but its meaning has been
hotly contested, it is not surprising that the dominant practice in
constitutional interpretation has heretofore been to rely on a process that puts
great stress on stare decisis and sticking with the initial judicial
understanding because it gives the text the consistent and predictable
meaning required for social stability.119 When the text is composed of more
general language, the Court has likewise relied heavily on the historical
practices of Congress and the Executive branch as well as its own precedents
and social morality—an approach resembling something like that taken in
the judicial development of the ever-evolving common law.120
Much of the current controversy arises when a new set of justices insists
that there is a clear original understanding of the meaning of some
constitutional text that overrides stare decisis.121 It is not at all clear that the
Founding Fathers would have taken such a rigid position. James Madison,
perhaps reluctantly but nevertheless believing it to be inevitable, accepted
that the meaning of the Constitution would probably be determined by
evolving governmental practice and by judicial construction in a manner that
would not always be strictly in accord with the text as it was understood by
the Founders. Writing some years after he had withdrawn from active
participation in public affairs, he believed that Congress breached the First
Amendment’s strictures against the establishment of religion when it
provided funds to pay the salary of military chaplains.122 It is hard to believe
that he would not have agreed with the dissenters in the government-funded
school bus and textbook cases.123 As has been pointed out many times, if one
119
See Michael Gentithes, In Defense of Stare Decisis, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 799, 799 (2009)
(explaining that stare decisis assures citizens that Supreme Court decisions remain consistent over time,
no matter who is on the Court, and keeps the Court sturdy when making final decisions on controversial
issues).
120
See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64
DUKE L.J. 1213, 1215, 1236 (2015) (discussing how historical events and precedent can affect
interpretation of the Constitution); David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885,
937 39 (2016) (highlighting the reliance of Justices Brennan and Stevens on principle and precedent, as
well as the necessity of accounting for broad historical and social happenings when examining cases);
David A. Strauss, Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 7, 49 (2015)
(discussing Obergefell v. Hodges as an example of the Supreme Court using “principles and precedents”
rather than the text of the Constitution when forming the majority opinion).
121
See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165,
1194 (2008) (stating that Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), implies
that “the meaning of the Constitution properly depends on how society views social facts at different
times”).
122
James Madison, Madison’s “Detatched Memoranda”, 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558–59
(Elizabeth Fleet ed., 1946). This is believed to have been written before 1832. Id. at 534–35.
123
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
a law which allowed a local school board to reimburse parents of children attending Roman Catholic
schools for school bus transportation costs created the “commingling” of Church and State in educational
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looks at the text, the First Amendment only prohibited Congress from
abridging freedom of speech and did not apply to the actions of other
branches of the federal government, let alone state governments.124 The fact
that no one raised any First Amendment objections to the federal courts
adjudicating common law defamation actions until 1964 certainly lends
support to that conclusion.125 As we all know, the prohibitions of the First
Amendment have now been applied to all government actors, including the
employees of states and municipalities and even entities receiving more than
de minimis governmental assistance.
V. THE HISTORICAL PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF WRITTEN
CONSTITUTIONS
Despite an explosion of scholarship on the subject of “originalism,” a
comprehensible and widely accepted understanding of what that term
connotes and how it serves to direct over time the course of constitutional
adjudication is not going to be achieved by sharpening the analytical and
linguistic skills of scholars and judges. It might be useful, therefore, to step
back and consider what historically was the structure and purpose of a
written constitution. The so-called English Constitution, to which reference
was often made well before the adoption of the American Constitution,

matters); id. at 63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (arguing that the law “introduce[d] religious education and
observances into the public schools” and “obtain[ed] public funds for the aid and support of various
private religious schools”); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968) (Black,
J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment’s prohibition against governmental establishment of religion was
written on the assumption that state aid to religion and religious schools generates discord, disharmony,
hatred, and strife among our people.”); id. at 266 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he result of tying parochial
school textbooks to public funds would be to put nonsectarian books into religious schools, which in the
long view would tend towards state domination of the church.”); id. at 270–71 (Fortas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the books “are selected and their use is prescribed by the sectarian authorities” and therefore
the “program [was] not one in which all children [were] treated alike . . .”).
124
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
125
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (holding that a state cannot, under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a public official “for defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice . . . ’”). Justice
Stone declared in his famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co. that “[t]here may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth,” but made no mention of
state common law. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), could be interpreted as presaging that result for civil litigation involving the First Amendment.
But it was not until Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), that the Court ruled that enforcement of a
state’s common law could be considered state action even in civil litigation between private parties. Id.
at 23.
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consisted of a mélange of unwritten conventions, including: that revenue
bills must originate in the House of Commons; that the House of Lords
should never refuse assent to bills for “supply” (i.e. budget bills);127 and
written declarations such as the English Bill of Rights of 1689, all of whose
provisions are stated either as statutory regulations governing governmental
practices or hortatory declarations as to what “ought” or what “ought not”
to be done.128 In either case, regardless of the importance or moral force of
these constitutional conventions, all their prohibitions or duties could be
infringed or altered by future acts of Parliament, and on occasion have
been.129
Written constitutions existed in Greece well before the time of
Aristotle,130 who died in 322 B.C.E., and quite possibly elsewhere as well.
As described in the Politics, the purpose of a constitution was to describe
who were the citizens of the body politic and to establish the structure of the
state and the process for electing officials, as well as to allocate the
responsibilities and duties of the individuals who filled the offices created
by the constitution.131 This almost exclusive focus on the structure of
government was a feature of constitutions well into the eighteenth century.
As such, they had no transcendent legal reach and could be altered by normal
legislative action. This emphasis on the largely procedural aspect of
constitutions and them being subject to normal legislative processes is
reflected by the fact that, as stated by the historian Jack Rakove, “[a]ll but
two of the [state] constitutions written in 1776 and 1777 were drafted by the
provincial conventions that acted as surrogate legislatures during the
Revolutionary interregnum . . . . None of these [state] constitutions were
submitted to the people for approval; they were not ratified but simply
promulgated by the bodies that drafted them.”132
126
Robert Blackburn, Britain’s Unwritten Constitution, BRITISH LIBRARY (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/britains-unwritten-constitution#.
127
See T.F. Moran, The Proposed Changes in the British House of Lords, 7 PROC. AM. POL. SC.
ASS’N 41, 45 (1910), which quotes the remarks of Prime Minister Asquith that “the action of the House
of Lords in refusing to pass into law the financial provisions made by this House . . . is a breach of the
Constitution and a usurpation of the rights of the Commons . . . and the most arrogant usurpation to which
for more than two centuries the House of Commons has been asked to submit.” Moran’s article discusses
the beginning of statutory limits to the power of the House of Lords arising out of the controversies
surrounding the Irish Home Rule Bill.
128
Bill of Rights 1 W. & M. 2 c.2 (1689).
129
For example, the line of succession set forth in the English Bill of Rights was changed by
Parliament in the Act of Settlement of 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c.2 (1701).
130
See X ATHENESIUM REPUBLICA (Constitution of the Athenians), THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH (Frederic G. Kenyon trans., Oxford 1921) (summarizing Athenian history
and its ancient constitutions).
131
X POLITICA, Bk. IV., THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH (Benjamin Jowett
trans., Oxford 1921).
132
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 97 (1996).

2018]

THE WELL-INTENTIONED PURPOSE

477

These early constitutions were largely concerned with the structure of
their post-colonial governments. It was common for many of the states to
have a preamble to their constitutions containing a bill of rights, often using
the language of the English Bill of Rights and framed using that document’s
wording of “ought” and “ought not,” rather than as legally enforceable
rights. The most famous of these was the Virginia Bill of Rights of June 12,
1776.133 The legislature that adopted it then reconvened as a constitutional
convention and adopted the Virginia Constitution of June 29, 1776, which
contained no legally enforceable individual rights other than the retention of
the existing rights of suffrage.134 The few legally enforceable rights
contained in these initial constitutions were largely confirmation of land
titles granted by the Crown135 and provisions granting the right to a jury trial
and the right of counsel in criminal trials.136 One of Jefferson’s complaints
about the Virginia Constitution was that, as an act of the legislature, it was
amendable by legislative action.137 In order to avoid this possible problem,
the United States Constitution required an up-or-down ratification by state
conventions rather than by acts of state legislatures.138 Undoubtedly this
feature contributed over time to the elevation of the Constitution to
something more important, and eventually much more sacred, than ordinary
legislation.
There is significant evidence, as pointed out by H. Jefferson Powell, that
many people at the time of the Constitution’s adoption anticipated that the
Constitution, while not subject to legislative change, would be subject to the
same methods of construction used by common law courts in construing
statutory enactments, which are the nearest analogues to a written
constitution.139 That is not to deny the trend during the last decade of the
eighteenth century to consider the Constitution as a document whose
interpretation should be treated more seriously than would be a mere statute.
This trend was encouraged by the increasingly popular notion proposed by
Thomas Jefferson that the Constitution was a pact between the states whose
133

George Mason, Transcription: The Virginia Declaration of Rights, June 12, 1776, LIBR. VA.,
http://edu.lva.virginia.gov/docs/VADeclaration.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
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See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. OF APRIL 20, 1777, art. XXXIV, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2018) (confirming land grants
made by the King of Great Britain).
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See, e.g., id. (granting counsel in impeachment, criminal, and civil actions).
137
See RAKOVE, supra note 132, at 99 (describing Jefferson’s argument that the Virginia
Constitution was not equipped to protect against legal challenges).
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Id. at 102.
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H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887
(1985).
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provisions were more like contractual terms, rather than those of a document
springing directly from the people.140
The novelty of the American Constitution was that it created a
fundamental document that includes many judicially enforceable human
rights and provides a significant role for the judiciary in construing that
document. Focusing only on the literal contemporary meaning of the text of
the Constitution ignores much of the historical hopes and fears of the
founding generation. It is not merely that many of the Founders expected
that the Constitution would evolve over time somewhat like the common
law. Focusing on contemporary understanding of the text of the Constitution
also ignores much of the mindset of the founding generation. The frequent
reliance on the thought of John Locke is an indication of the contemporary
view that all valid law was in some way underpinned, as was the Declaration
of Independence, by the natural law. More specifically, one might ask what
the Founders would have expected the courts to do if adherence to the
original understanding, assuming it actually could be discovered, led to
unjust or silly results. Would the Founders not also have views about the
priority of conflicting constitutional provisions should an immediate
decision need to be made? As the next section of this Essay maintains, would
they not also have expectations, hopes, and fears about the future in which
they and their descendants would live their lives? Surely all these aspects of
their mindsets would be part of the original understanding.
VI. WHAT WERE THE HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE GENERATION
THAT PRODUCED THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?
Probably the most important question is what were the long-run hopes
and expectations of those who drafted and adopted the Constitution?
Obviously, they wanted a stable institution and one whose basic structure
did not change overnight. That is why they made it difficult to amend. At
the same time, they also wanted an institution that could endure indefinitely
over time. The language they used was a means to an end and not an end in
itself. Would they have accepted that the clear meaning of two conflicting
constitutional provisions must be honored even if it led to government
paralysis? This would make the Constitution a set of discreet absolute
individual provisions and ignore the Founders’ purpose in drafting that
document. If they had realized that the Earth was much older than the
contemporary common assumption of roughly six-thousand years and likely
to endure for billions more,141 they would have had even more reason to
140
See H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ’98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV.
689, 692 (1994) (discussing Thomas Jefferson’s efforts to support his narrow interpretation).
141
See MARIO LIVIO, BRILLIANT BLUNDERS 60–62, 73–75 (2013) (exemplifying that even among
brilliant scientists, well into the middle of the twentieth century, it was widely thought that the earth was
at most 500,000 years old).
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place added weight on accommodating unforeseen future needs. They surely
would have agreed with Justice Jackson that the Constitution should not be
turned into a “suicide pact.”142 The real question is whether they expected
and indeed wanted an institution whose framework would evolve gradually
over time as the social and economic environment of the nation evolved, or
whether they were committed to the view that, unless the Constitution were
amended, it should forever be fixed to support a late-eighteenth century
society, even if it was clear beyond any doubt that rigidity would lead to
disaster. Would they have preferred a gradual common-law-like evolution
or would they have instead reconciled themselves to accepting abrupt
changes brought about by civil war or by economic collapse?
To take the Second Amendment, even assuming that personal defense
rather than the need for supporting a militia was the main purpose of the
amendment, would the Founders want no accommodation in broadening the
permissible regulation of firearms? What if their overwhelmingly rural
society evolved into one that was largely urban with professional police
forces? What if it also had a gun homicide rate more than five times higher
than the country with the next highest rate among advanced societies and
twelve times the rate in Germany?143 Would they also have assumed that the
concept of “commerce among the states” as well as with foreign countries
would be forever fixed as it was understood in the late eighteenth century?
To say that the Founders were not following the tack of some
interpreters of religious texts—who claim that the moral and social norms
of a body politic were fixed forever in the second or third centuries or the
seventh and eighth centuries of the common era—because the problem could
be fixed by constitutional amendment is unrealistic. How would such an
amendment be worded? Would it declare that “commerce” should be
defined by current twenty-first century conditions or more generally by
evolving contemporary economic conditions? As rapidly as the global,
social, demographic, and economic conditions are changing, any relatively
concrete provisions designed to deal with current issues would quickly
become obsolete. The amendment process would not only always be behind
in adjusting, but would also end up producing a lengthy document that could
142
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Although his comment
was hyperbolic in that case, the comment was apropos. Thomas Jefferson believed that the acquisition
of the vast territory of the Louisiana Purchase required a constitutional amendment because the
Constitution granted no such authority. JEREMY D. BAILEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND EXECUTIVE POWER
172 (2007). He nevertheless approved it on grounds of necessity and sent the treaty between France and
the United States to the Senate, which handily ratified, and Congress provided the funding. See id. at
171–72 (describing the maneuvering around the constitutionality of the purchase).
143
See Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, Comparing Gun Deaths by Country: The U.S. is in a
Different World, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/upshot/comparethese-gun-death-rates-the-us-is-in-a-different-world.html (comparing gun death rates of the United
States and Germany).
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no longer serve the symbolic role that the Constitution does today. As is well
known, at the time the Constitution was being drafted, Jeremy Bentham
argued that to abolish judicial law making, all law should be expressed in a
written code enacted by the legislature.144 He recognized that those who
drafted the code could not provide for every eventuality.145 His solution was
that, when faced with a gap in the law, judges should put the case on hold
and refer the uncertainty to the legislature for resolution.146 The
impracticality of that solution is apparent. Dependence on regular
amendment of the Constitution is not a plausible solution to the problem of
judicial discretion. If the options open to the Founders were either to create
a society whose structure was largely fixed in the eighteenth century or to
create a governmental structure that allowed gradual change to meet
unforeseen challenges, it is not at all clear that they would have chosen the
former. It is hard to believe that they would have preferred a sclerotic
approach to one that left room for the exercise of practical wisdom.
CONCLUSION
All laws, including constitutions, are means to an end, and hopefully,
like moral precepts, that end is to achieve human well-being. That is why
the traditional and broader concept of morality, which, following Aristotle
and espoused by St. Thomas Aquinas and countless others, refuses to accept
that morality can be completely captured by a universe of rights and duties
or in a rigid hierarchy of rights.147 These are only means of achieving a good
life and a good society rather than ends in themselves. Because of their
generality they, like the law, are always subject to exceptions to
accommodate unanticipated circumstances.148 The fate of the world cannot
be based on semantics. It is this feature that makes it impossible for any rulebound system to achieve complete congruity with all of the dimensions of
either the moral or legal universes. It is an illusion of beginning law students
that the study of law consists in memorizing rules that can be applied in a
syllogistical process that always produces the correct decisions in legal
disputes.
144
JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 240 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970). This work was probably
written around 1782, but discovered in the Bentham papers in University College London and first
published in 1945 in an edition entitled The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined.
145
Id. at 241.
146
Id.
147
For a description of this approach, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
(1980).
148
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. V, Ch. 10, 1137a–38a (Lesley Brown
ed., David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (describing the difficulty in making universal
statements and therefore the importance of the adaptation of rules); 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, PART ONE OF THE SECOND PART, at Q. 97, Art. 1 (Dominican Fathers trans., 1948)
(concluding that nothing, including laws, can be unchangeable).
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Under the traditional approach, the moral universe is based upon the
notion of the good. Thus, it is ultimately based on a set of fundamental goods
whose value is universally recognized as necessary for human flourishing,
such as, for example, the intrinsic worth of life itself and the human capacity
to exercise reason. This is also the ideal goal of the law. All of these
fundamental goods are of equal importance149 because they lead to a society
in which people can live a rich and meaningful life. Their achievement, and
the accommodation among them when these goods conflict, require the
exercise of practical wisdom150 by those charged with their implementation;
that is to say, on the exercise of good judgment and the recognition that the
search for the perfect can often lead to the sacrifice of the good. Aquinas
expressly accepted that, in the drafting and application of law, one must also
take into account the existing customs and opinions of the community, as
well as the material needs of the community.151 This is a precept that cannot
totally be ignored in constitutional adjudication.
Admittedly, law, and even some moral precepts, must accept some level
of arbitrariness to accommodate the generality of application that makes a
complex society capable of functioning in a fair and predictable way.
Nevertheless, there must be a limit to arbitrariness that leads to extreme
injustice or dangerous policy. A recent classic example is Pena-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, which involved a prosecution for sexual assault in which the
defendant was found guilty.152 Two jurors signed affidavits stating that one
of the jurors “believed the defendant was guilty because, in [his] experience
as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused
them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women.”153 That
juror also stated that “I think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican
men take whatever they want,”154 and that, in his experience, “nine times out
of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and
young girls.”155 Finally, he said he did not find the defendant’s alibi witness
credible because he was “an illegal.”156 Actually, that witness had testified
that he was a legal resident of the United States.157 In a five-to-three decision,
149
See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 148, PART ONE OF THE SECOND PART, at Q. 94, Art. 2 (analyzing
that all laws are derived from the same common foundation).
150
Id. PART TWO OF THE SECOND PART, at Q. 47–51 (discussing more extensively the concept of
“Prudence”).
151
Id. PART ONE OF THE SECOND PART, at Q. 96, Art. 1. Richard Hooker expressly accepted the
same. See Richard Hooker, 1 OF THE LAWES OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITIE: EIGHT BOOKS 15, § C 2
(William Stansbye ed., 1632) (arguing that the material well-being of human beings is essential if they
are to live a virtuous life).
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the Court held that Colorado’s absolute juror impeachment rule was, for
constitutional reasons, subject to exceptions and remanded the case to the
Colorado Supreme Court “for further proceedings not inconsistent” with its
opinion.158 Justice Alito, writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justice Thomas, declared that although the Court’s decision was “wellintentioned . . . it is questionable whether our system of trial by jury can
endure this attempt to perfect it.”159 Justice Thomas went further in declaring
that “the Court’s holding also cannot be squared with the original
understanding of the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments.”160
All one can say in conclusion is that there must be some limit to the
amount of injustice that a decent legal system can tolerate. It is hard to
believe that the Founders would have disagreed.

158

Id. at 871.
Id. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting). To the extent that that might be true, the horse is out of the barn
because, as stated by the majority, seventeen jurisdictions—some for over fifty years—have recognized
a “racial-bias exception.” Id. at 870.
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